Animals : Alice Crary

The last half-century has witnessed a striking upsurge in interest concerning questions about animals, ethics and politics. Yet philosophers and animal advocates have been surprisingly reluctant to treat the bare fact that a creature is an animal as morally significant. This article traces some of the most prominent attempts to think about animals as proper objects of. . .

Animals : Alice Crary

The last half-century has witnessed a striking upsurge in interest concerning questions about animals, ethics and politics. Yet philosophers and animal advocates have been surprisingly reluctant to treat the bare fact that a creature is an animal as morally significant. This article traces some of the most prominent attempts to think about animals as proper objects of. . .

Anticipation : Gary Wilder

Theodor Adorno famously concluded Minima Moralia with the cryptic suggestion that “the only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things from the standpoint of redemption . . . Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as. . .

Anticipation : Gary Wilder

Theodor Adorno famously concluded Minima Moralia with the cryptic suggestion that “the only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things from the standpoint of redemption . . . Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as. . .

Archē : Stathis Gourgouris

I can say, perhaps a little playfully but not altogether inaccurately, that I’ve chosen to engage with the very first political concept—certainly in name, if nothing else. But as you will see my reading is precisely to demonstrate how, from its initial invocation (from its archē, as it were), this concept renders any notions of the first or of the one impossible, indeterminable, an-archic.

Archē : Stathis Gourgouris

I can say, perhaps a little playfully but not altogether inaccurately, that I’ve chosen to engage with the very first political concept—certainly in name, if nothing else. But as you will see my reading is precisely to demonstrate how, from its initial invocation (from its archē, as it were), this concept renders any notions of the first or of the one impossible, indeterminable, an-archic.

Archive : Ariella Azoulay

For the past two decades, the Hegelian concept Aufhebung keeps appearing in the elaborate literature written on the subject of archives. It describes archival work. Here is a late, characteristic example of this approach: “To archive is to put away, to shelter, to keep . . . The modality of Aufhebung, conventionally translated into English as ‘sublation’. . .

Archive : Ariella Azoulay

For the past two decades, the Hegelian concept Aufhebung keeps appearing in the elaborate literature written on the subject of archives. It describes archival work. Here is a late, characteristic example of this approach: “To archive is to put away, to shelter, to keep . . . The modality of Aufhebung, conventionally translated into English as ‘sublation’. . .

Authority : Avital Ronell

Neither powered up by a solid sense of (or even desire for) legitimacy, nor a control freak with regard to the possibilities of comprehension, I abide with the weaker neighborhoods of thought, where things do not always work out or offer the narcissistic comfort of landing in the vicinity of secured sense. This time, in order to get a running start on the motif. . .

Authority : Avital Ronell

Neither powered up by a solid sense of (or even desire for) legitimacy, nor a control freak with regard to the possibilities of comprehension, I abide with the weaker neighborhoods of thought, where things do not always work out or offer the narcissistic comfort of landing in the vicinity of secured sense. This time, in order to get a running start on the motif. . .

Better : Jacques Lezra

“Better” words—that’s a claim we could understand; perhaps today we could generally endorse the idea that it’s better to have better words to hand than less-good ones (though we’d be hard-pressed to correlate an education, even or especially at an Ivy League school, with the “knowledge” or “having” of such better words). Some words are “better” than others . . .

Better : Jacques Lezra

“Better” words—that’s a claim we could understand; perhaps today we could generally endorse the idea that it’s better to have better words to hand than less-good ones (though we’d be hard-pressed to correlate an education, even or especially at an Ivy League school, with the “knowledge” or “having” of such better words). Some words are “better” than others . . .

Blood : Gil Anidjar

The inclusion of blood in a lexicon of political concepts would seem to require the removal of two quite formidable obstacles. First, blood is not a concept. And second, blood is not political. I shall return to the first obstacle, but I should begin by deferring to understandable reservations with regards to the removal of the second. For who. . .

Blood : Gil Anidjar

The inclusion of blood in a lexicon of political concepts would seem to require the removal of two quite formidable obstacles. First, blood is not a concept. And second, blood is not political. I shall return to the first obstacle, but I should begin by deferring to understandable reservations with regards to the removal of the second. For who. . .

Bubble : Anat Biletzki

Is “bubble” a concept, except in the trivial sense in which every word ensconced in quotes becomes a concept, or rather a “concept”? More pertinently, is it a political concept? Is the philosophical exercise of making it a political concept a legitimate exercise, or, does such an exercise run the professional risk of philosophical facetiousness?

Bubble : Anat Biletzki

Is “bubble” a concept, except in the trivial sense in which every word ensconced in quotes becomes a concept, or rather a “concept”? More pertinently, is it a political concept? Is the philosophical exercise of making it a political concept a legitimate exercise, or, does such an exercise run the professional risk of philosophical facetiousness?

Civil Religion : Judith Butler

In Balibar’s 1985 Spinoza and Politics, he follows a complex and compelling trajectory through Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and the Ethics, to show how a political structure of democracy is articulated through the reflections on religion, specifically on God, law, nature, and love. Spinoza is said to lament the degeneration of religion into superstition on the . . .

Civil Religion : Judith Butler

In Balibar’s 1985 Spinoza and Politics, he follows a complex and compelling trajectory through Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and the Ethics, to show how a political structure of democracy is articulated through the reflections on religion, specifically on God, law, nature, and love. Spinoza is said to lament the degeneration of religion into superstition on the . . .

Civilization : Susan Buck-Morss

I do not like the formulation of the question: What is Civilization? It calls for a definition of the concept, a list of its descriptive determinations. Or, it evokes a well-known critical move: the announcement that civilization is constructed, followed by a genealogy of how, historically, such a construction occurred and whose interests were thereby served. . .

Civilization : Susan Buck-Morss

I do not like the formulation of the question: What is Civilization? It calls for a definition of the concept, a list of its descriptive determinations. Or, it evokes a well-known critical move: the announcement that civilization is constructed, followed by a genealogy of how, historically, such a construction occurred and whose interests were thereby served. . .

Colony : Ann Laura Stoler

Political concepts work upon us for very different reasons and entreat our attention in very different ways. Some impose their authority over our thinking and actions because they saturate our environment, incanted strategically, or wondrously shorn of reflection on the public stage. We might seize on them for scrutiny because they seem to offer the possibility of disrupting the. . .

Colony : Ann Laura Stoler

Political concepts work upon us for very different reasons and entreat our attention in very different ways. Some impose their authority over our thinking and actions because they saturate our environment, incanted strategically, or wondrously shorn of reflection on the public stage. We might seize on them for scrutiny because they seem to offer the possibility of disrupting the. . .

Comedy : Dmitri Nikulin

When we are engaged in a commonly shared and recognized activity that follows certain implicit or explicit rules and pursues particular ends, we do not always notice these rules and ends. Yet, reflecting on them might be important, since it would allow us to better understand the legitimacy and presuppositions of our actions, interactions, and strivings, and . . .

Comedy : Dmitri Nikulin

When we are engaged in a commonly shared and recognized activity that follows certain implicit or explicit rules and pursues particular ends, we do not always notice these rules and ends. Yet, reflecting on them might be important, since it would allow us to better understand the legitimacy and presuppositions of our actions, interactions, and strivings, and . . .

Concept : Étienne Balibar

It is an extremely perilous task to offer a paper among a collection such as this, and especially to have to do it with a tentative definition of the concept of “concept. But it is also a challenge that I take gladly, because it provides me with a unique occasion to return to some philosophical questions that have occupied me throughout my life for reasons many of which have . . .

Concept : Étienne Balibar

It is an extremely perilous task to offer a paper among a collection such as this, and especially to have to do it with a tentative definition of the concept of “concept. But it is also a challenge that I take gladly, because it provides me with a unique occasion to return to some philosophical questions that have occupied me throughout my life for reasons many of which have . . .

Concept : Adi Ophir

Of the many thinkers engaged in conceptual work, only few stop and ask “What is a concept?” This is the question I wish to engage with here. Its form is Socratic, and it is indeed in Socrates’s inquiries that it first appears. “Philosophers have not been sufficiently concerned with the nature of the concept as philosophical reality,” argue Deleuze and Guattari. . .

Concept : Adi Ophir

Of the many thinkers engaged in conceptual work, only few stop and ask “What is a concept?” This is the question I wish to engage with here. Its form is Socratic, and it is indeed in Socrates’s inquiries that it first appears. “Philosophers have not been sufficiently concerned with the nature of the concept as philosophical reality,” argue Deleuze and Guattari. . .

Concept II : Adi Ophir

Concepts are not terms. The distinction between the two should be maintained and its articulation should be part of any attempt to answer the question ‘what is a concept?’ The distinction should be articulated even if one conceives concepts to be terms of a special kind; without it concepts would be reduced to the status of grammatical entities, a class of . . .

Concept II : Adi Ophir

Concepts are not terms. The distinction between the two should be maintained and its articulation should be part of any attempt to answer the question ‘what is a concept?’ The distinction should be articulated even if one conceives concepts to be terms of a special kind; without it concepts would be reduced to the status of grammatical entities, a class of . . .